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A Tale of Two Clams: Policy Anticipation and Industry Productivity

Abstract
Sound environmental regulation must achieve environmental objectives while maximizing
economic efficiency. This paper evaluates the impact of regulation on efficiency by measuring
annual productivity across regulatory regimes in two similar fisheries with differing policy
expectations. Anticipation of regulatory change produced strategic behavior in one fishery,
leading to depressed productivity; in the other, regulatory change was not expected, and
productivity did not suffer. These results imply that fisheries regulation should take into account
both firms’ policy expectations and the potentially perverse incentives that may be created by
policy change.
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I. Introduction
The challenge of environmental economics is to achieve both biological conservation and
economic efficiency. As a result, the relationship between regulation and productivity is of
central importance to the field. Two of the leading forms of environmental regulation are
command-and-control (limitations on inputs such as capital or effort) and tradable property rights
systems. The economic literature establishes that, under general assumptions, a given
environmental standard can be met at a lower cost under tradable property rights than under
command-and-control.1 However, this has not translated into general acceptance of tradable
property rights in public policy.
Fisheries management in particular is an area where competing regulatory approaches
have led to volatile policy debates and economic inefficiencies. The current national fisheries
legislation, the Magnuson-Stevens Act of 1996, establishes biological conservation as the
primary goal and economic efficiency the secondary goal of fisheries management.2 This raises
the following economic question: what regulatory tool maximizes economic efficiency, given
the biologically determined total allowable harvest? In fisheries, traditional command-andcontrol has generally led to tremendous overcapitalization,3 while tradable property rights should
theoretically limit the number of fishermen and result in optimal harvesting capacity.4
Therefore, one measure of comparison is productivity under the competing policy approaches.
A great deal of empirical work has focused on comparing productivity across different
regulatory approaches and regulatory changes. This research generally treats policy change as an
exogenous shock, ignoring the ability of firms to change their behavior during the transition
period. However, it is possible that expectations of policy change have a significant impact on
productivity – prior to the actual implementation of a new regulatory policy. If firms do in fact

2

adjust their behavior during the transition period, then any analysis of productivity must separate
the effects of behavioral shifts before and after policy change.
This paper calculates productivity over three policy eras: command-and-control,
transition (command-and-control regulation concurrent with negotiations over tradable property
rights), and tradable property rights. Productivity is calculated for both the Mid-Atlantic surf
clam and ocean quahog fisheries in order to demonstrate the impact of firms’ expectations on
industry productivity (as expectations differed in the two fisheries). The results show that firms
that anticipate implementation of property rights will change their behavior during the transition
period, with measurable effects on overall productivity. In the surf clam fishery, while the new
property rights regime was being negotiated, firms raced to maximize their production, thus
depressing productivity; in the quahog fishery, by contrast, tradable property rights were
implemented without negotiation, and with no prior change in firm behavior.

II. Regulatory Approaches and Measuring Productivity
A. Regulatory Debates in Renewable Resources: Mid-Atlantic Clam Fisheries
Fisheries regulation has long been a flashpoint in the controversy between command-andcontrol regulation and tradable property rights. The need for fisheries regulation of some sort is
well established. Open-access fisheries are often cited as one of the classic examples of market
failure due to externalities: in the absence of property rights, the individual fisherman does not
take into consideration the effect of his harvest on the total available stock, resulting in endemic
overfishing.
In order to limit excessive exploitation, federal fisheries have historically been regulated
through command-and-control policies: limits on the number of hours that fishing is allowed,
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the type of gear allowed, and other inputs. Evaluation of command-and-control in fisheries has
shown serious economic inefficiencies, safety hazards, and detriments to the ecosystem
(National Research Council, 1999). In addition to these economic inefficiencies and safety
concerns, these policies have generally also failed in their primary goal of protecting marine
resources (National Marine Fishery Service, 1996; National Research Council, 1999; Gauvin et
al. 1995). This evidence has provoked interest in the use of tradable property rights – known in
fisheries as individual transferable quotas, or ITQs – to regulate marine resources.
The Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries have been governed by both
command-and-control and ITQs. As the first U.S. Federal marine fisheries to implement
tradable property rights, they remain of central interest in assessing the relative merits of tradable
property rights and command-and-control in fisheries (for a discussion see GAO, 2002). Both
fisheries were subject to command-and-control regulation from 1979 through 1989 but have been
governed by ITQs since 1990. While tradable property rights were implemented in both
fisheries concurrently, in the years prior to implementation it was generally believed that tradable
property rights would affect the surf clam fishery only.5 Therefore, the two fisheries provide a
unique view of two industries with similar inputs and outputs but differing expectations
concerning regulatory policy.
With annual production valued at over $48 million, the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean
quahog fisheries provide almost the entire supply for domestic processed clam products (NMFS,
1999), including canned clam chowder, canned minced clams, canned sauces and juices, and
breaded products. Both clam species grow slowly, live on the floor of the ocean, and do not
move. They are clustered in groups known as beds, whose location and density are common
knowledge in the industry, and harvested using hydraulic dredges. Ocean quahogs are found in
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deeper waters than surf clams, thus necessitating larger vessels with more horsepower and gear
appropriate to harvesting in deeper waters.
By the mid-1980s, rapid growth in harvesting capacity and its resulting inefficiencies
triggered a debate over establishing tradable property rights. As with other overcapitalized
fisheries, command-and-control in the surf clam fishery was progressively restrictive, ratcheting
down the allowed fishing time as the season's allowable harvest was gathered in a shorter and
shorter time. The time each vessel was allowed to harvest surf clams fell by 28% from 1980 to
1982 and another 88% from 1983 to 1986. As Table 1 shows, the average annual quota and
harvests of surf clams and ocean quahogs increased slightly between 1980-84 and 1985-1989,
and since 1989 have remained relatively stable. Abundance of both clam species fluctuates very
little over the harvesting season.
Moving toward an ITQ system to regulate these fisheries required a means of allocating
the initial property rights, or harvesting quotas. Although the economic literature prefers
auctioning off initial property rights, such auctions have proved to be politically unviable in the
United States as well as in other nations’ fisheries. From the beginning of negotiations over a
tradable property rights system for surf clams in the mid-1980s, it was clear that allocations
would be granted gratis based on some form of historical harvest quantities.6 A critical aspect of
the allocation mechanism was that property rights would be distributed on a vessel basis, not
directly to vessel owners; thus, the property right asset was embedded in the vessel asset. Prior
to the negotiation period, there were some vessels that were licensed to harvest surf clams and
ocean quahogs but were not actively utilized; the expectation of a future property right created
the incentive to harvest with these vessels in order to establish a historical record of harvests. As
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a result, while the number of licensed vessels could not change due to the moratorium of 1979,
the number of active vessels did increase during the negotiation period of 1985-1989.7
During the negotiation period, there were more vessels active in the surf clam fishery
than in the prior period, an increase primarily due to the re-entrance of previously inactive large
vessels. From 1980 to 1984, the median number of vessels in the fishery was 119; from 1985 to
1989, the median number was 138, with a peak of 144 in 1986. This movement of vessels back
into the fishery was a direct consequence of the decision to distribute rights to active vessels, and
increased pressure on the clam population.
The formula for distributing allocations was finalized in 1989, with initial allocations
based on individual vessels’ catch history, and the new property rights system was implemented
in 1990. At this point, the property right was disaggregated from the vessel and could be traded
as a separate asset. As predicted by economic models, there followed a significant reduction in
the number of vessels in the industry, with the median number of active vessels falling to 56 in
the 1990-1995 period. The remainder of this paper expands on these statistical observations to
look closely at the relationship between regulation and overall industry productivity.
B. Empirical Evidence of Productivity and Regulation
The relationship between environmental regulation and productivity has motivated a wide
range of empirical research. One area of active research centers on the “Porter Hypothesis,”
which suggests that there are opportunities where both environmental externalities can be
reduced and productivity can be increased (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Despite the large
volume of work in this area, the nature of this relationship remains a contentious issue (see for
example Palmer et al. (1995), Boyd and McClelland (1999)). Much of the current literature
compares productivity under varying levels of severity of the environmental constraints (see
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Barbera and McConnell (1990), Gollop, and Roberts (1983), Färe, et al. (1989)). Recent studies
have focused on the investor-owned electricity industry (Knittel, 2002) and oil refineries
(Berman and Bui, 2001).
There is also a significant body of literature comparing the productivity of privatelyowned versus publicly-owned firms (see Hausman and Neufeld (1991) for an empirical analysis
of electric utilities; see Nelson (1981) for a review of economic research on productivity). Some
recent empirical work has focused on the change in efficiency due to restructuring and
deregulation in the electric power industry (Kleit and Terrell, 2001).
In general, when evaluating the productivity impact of regulation, it is necessary to
establish a baseline for comparison, because changes in environmental policy alter the incentives
of economic actors (Jaffe et al. 2002). Because firms in the surf clam fishery acted in
anticipation of policy change, while firms in the quahog fishery did not, the baseline must be
established in the period prior to policy negotiation – a significant difference from other analyses
that simply compare periods immediately before and after policy implementation. As a result,
this paper differs from numerous studies of productivity and regulation (for a review of natural
resource industries see Simpson, 1999) by explicitly isolating the effect of firms’ policy
expectations. The importance of these expectations can be clearly seen by comparing these two
industries, where firms had opposite policy expectations.
Available data on the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries makes it possible to calculate
productivity over three distinct policy environments: command-and-control, transition, and
tradable property rights. This three-period analysis demonstrates the crucial importance of firm
expectations and their resulting strategic behavior in assessing productivity change – behavior
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that would be invisible to a simple two-period analysis centered on the actual implementation of
the new regulatory regime.

III. Empirical Investigation
By comparing two industries with opposite policy expectations over three distinct
regulatory periods, this paper makes it possible to isolate the effect of those expectations on
industry productivity. To do so, this paper uses the standard Tornqvist index approach to
calculating total factor productivity.
Total factor productivity (TFPt ) - the ratio of aggregate output (Yt ) to aggregate inputs
(Xt ) - has a lengthy history in economics beginning with the work of Solow in 1957 and
continuing with Jorgenson (1990) and Griliches (1998). In order to compare TFP over multiple
years, it is natural to create a TFP index, defined as TFP in year t relative to TFP in a reference
year; this index is the ratio of the production function evaluated at two different periods in time,
holding the input bundle constant. The rate of change in productivity is then the logarithmic
& ). In the natural resource context we are
derivative of this index with respect to time (TFP

interested in changes relative to the change in the level of the resource (population abundance,
for fisheries); thus, if the abundance of the clams (At ) is a multiplicative factor in the production
function, then we can divide through by abundance (Yˆt = Yt

At

).

Two difficulties arise in calculating this measure of productivity change: (1) creating
aggregate inputs and outputs and (2) the discrete nature of the data. This paper employs the
established approach of using the Tornqvist discrete approximation of the Divisia index, in
which inputs are weighted by their cost shares (for input i, Si). If there is more than one output,
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then outputs are likewise weighted by their revenue shares (Ri). (In our case, each fishing trip is
for one output only.) The rate of change of total factor productivity [TFP] is then:
(1.1)

æ ˆ ö
æ
ö
& = ln çç Yt ÷÷ - å N 0.5(S + S ) ln çç X t,i ÷÷
TFP
i =1
t, i
t -1, i
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Taking antilogs of (1.1) gives:
(1.2)
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N æ
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Yˆt
ç
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=
- Õç
TFPt -1 Yˆt-1 i =1 ççè Xt -1,i ÷ø

The equations for rate of change in TFP (1.1) and the chain index of TFP (1.2) have several
desirable properties. Diewert showed that if the technology can be represented as a homogenous
translog function then the Tornqvist index is exact.8 The translog production function provides
for great flexibility because it is a second-order approximation to any arbitrary twicecontinuously-differentiable production function (Diewert, 1976). Although an individual
vessel’s fishing trip is likely to have a fixed-proportions technology, there is significant variation
across vessels (for example, in captain experience, age of vessel, etc.). These non-conformities
may be used to justify the use of a smooth function to approximate an aggregate production
function (Berck et al., 1988). Additionally, it can be shown that the Tornqvist index is exact for
the generalized Leontief production function (Chambers, 1988). Constructing an index is a
nonparametric approach; therefore, it does not require restrictive assumptions about the
functional form of production. The index number approach uses only observable data and can be
used to estimate productivity change without estimating cost, production or profit functions.
Conversely, there are drawbacks to this standard measure of TFP. One criticism of the
index number is that it does not allow for the decomposition of productivity change into its
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components of technical change and efficiency change. However, this analysis is concerned
with the effect of regulation on the sum of technical change and efficiency change. Of more
consequence is the assumption that firms are profit maximizers (inputs are chosen optimally) and
face competitive input and output markets. In the case of the clam industry, the variable factor
inputs are fungible across alternative fisheries, making it reasonable to assume that the input
market is near enough to competitive that inputs would be paid approximately their marginal
products in the absence of command-and-control.
This paper calculates the Tornqvist index of productivity change in order to measure the
impact of policy change – and expectations of policy change – on industry productivity.
C. Data
The data for this analysis are drawn from sixteen years of observations, from 1980 to
1995, on the Mid-Atlantic ocean quahog and surf clam fisheries. The two primary sources are:
the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS) vessel logbooks (in accordance with the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-265) and pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
1801, which records inputs and outputs for each fishing trip for each vessel (including time at
sea, time spent fishing, quantity harvested, gear type, etc); and the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Council
Federal Management Plan #8 (FMP #8). In order to harvest either surf clams or ocean quahogs
in federal waters, vessels must have a valid license from the National Marine Fishery Service and
maintain a vessel logbook; therefore, the data used in this paper include all vessels active in the
federal fisheries during this time period.
The Tornqvist index of TFP relies on measuring aggregate inputs and output. The
measure of output is the harvest for each vessel class in the Economic Exclusive Zone by
federally licensed vessels. Output for any given trip is the quantity of surf clams or ocean
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quahogs harvested.9 Annual surf clam industry output is the sum of output for each vessel class
weighted by the revenue share (Rj = PYj/PY) for that vessel class (Y=Σ jRjYj, for j = class one
and class two). Output prices are reported in processors’ records submitted to the Mid-Atlantic
Fishery Management Council in accordance with regulation of seafood processors.10
The aggregate input is a function of the quantity used and price of each input. Inputs
include harvesting capital (fishing vessel), gear (supplies used during a fishing trip), fuel, and
labor (fishing crew). Specific inputs are calculated as follows:
•

The major form of capital is the fishing vessel, which can be used to harvest either
surf clams or ocean quahogs with minimal gear change. Each vessel is registered
with NMFS, at which time characteristics such as gear type, number and size of
dredges, and vessel size (in gross registered tonnage, or GRT) are reported.
Fishing vessels are differentiated into two size categories based on vessel weight
(small = vessels less than or equal to 100 GRT; large = vessels greater than 100
GRT). The quantity of capital in each fishery is calculated by aggregating the
number of vessels reporting harvests in federal logbooks each year by vessel size
categories.

•

Use of fuel is a function of total time spent fishing and the number of vessels in
each size class as reported in FMP #8 (page 48). The price per gallon of number
two diesel marine fuel is from the Energy Information Agency.

•

Gear costs by vessel class per trip are approximately $1,500 for class one and
$2,500 for class two (calculated using FMP #8). Capital service prices are
assumed to be the sum of 5% of the book value of capital plus repair costs and
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depreciation (Berman and Bui, 2001.) Estimates of the value of capital are from
FMP #8.
•

Quantity of labor used is expressed in man-hours and calculated as the number of
crew members per vessel multiplied by the number of hours at sea, then
aggregated over all harvesting vessels. For each vessel class, labor costs are
estimated as 33% of annual gross revenue.11

The aggregate input is the sum over each vessel class of the quantities of the individual
inputs (vessels, gear, fuel and labor), weighted by cost shares for each vessel class and input
combination.

(1.3)

æ
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Descriptive statistics for variables used in the Tornqvist TFP index are shown below in Table 2
through Table 5. Table 2 shows the mean cost in the surf clam fishery by input and vessel size
over the three periods of analysis. As would be expected, costs for larger vessels exceed those for
small vessels in all time periods. The cost shares by vessel size and input for the surf clam
fishery are shown in Table 3. The most significant change was the general decrease in the cost
share for fuel after 1984, with a corresponding increase in the labor cost share. A summary of
costs by input and vessel size for the ocean quahog fishery is displayed in Table 4. Ocean
quahogs are harvested primarily by larger vessels which are able to travel to the clam beds in
deeper waters. The crew’s remuneration for quahogs reflects the lower price paid per unit of
harvested quahog relative to surf calms. The average annual costs and cost shares for the ocean
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quahog fishery, shown in Table 5, reflect the dominance of the larger vessels with lower labor
costs relative to fuel, gear and capital costs.

IV. Results
Annual productivity over 1980-1995 is calculated for the surf clam and ocean quahog
fisheries using the Tornqvist index of total factor productivity. The key issue of interest is how
productivity in the two clam fisheries differs over the three relevant periods (1980-1984, 19851989, and 1990-1995). The results are summarized by species and policy period in Tables 6 and
712 . For both species, the average productivity level decreases during the transition period
(negotiation of property rights) and then increases after implementation of tradable property
rights.
Comparing the indexes for the separate fisheries reveals a potential pattern of strategic
behavior by forward-looking firms in the surf clam fishery. While the two fisheries had similar
annual average productivity levels in the early 1980s, their paths diverged during the transition
period, when a tradable property rights system was being negotiated for surf clams. During the
first period (command-and-control), the average annual total factor productivity was 1.07 for the
surf clam fishery and 1.02 for the ocean quahog fishery. During the transition period when
industry was negotiating property rights for surf clams only, the average TFP in the surf clam
industry (characterized by property rights negotiations) decreased by 5.5 percent, while the
quahog fishery (with no negotiations) experienced little more than a 1 percent decline. After the
implementation of tradable property rights, productivity in the surf clam fishery increased almost
9 percent, while the increase in the quahog fishery was approximately 4 percent. The depression
of total factor productivity in the surf claim fishery during property rights negotiations reflects
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firms’ increased capital holdings as they returned previously inactive vessels to the fleet. The
recovery of productivity in the surf clam fishery after the implementation of ITQs reflects the
retirement of these vessels once the immediate reason for their use (establishing catch histories)
no longer applied.
The changes in TFP in the two fisheries illustrate how firms adjusted the allocation of
capital across the fisheries in response to changes in expected returns. Together, the surf clam
and ocean quahog fisheries can be thought of as a “manmade natural” experiment (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 2000) in which the control industry is the quahog fishery and the surf clam fishery
is subjected to the “experiment” of new policy expectations. The increase in productivity under
property rights (1990-95) relative to under command and control (1980-84) was similar in both
fisheries (2.8% and 2.4% for surf clams and ocean quahog, respectively), reflecting long-term
trends, including the shift from command-and-control to ITQs. But in the short term, differing
policy expectations caused productivity to follow a markedly different path in each fishery. The
implication for economic evaluations is clear. The 8.9% increase in productivity greatly
overstates the gains from implementing property rights, because it is a result of the negotiation
prior to the policy change.
In addition to the level of TFP, we can examine the rate of change in productivity during
the alternative policy periods, as shown in Table 8. During command-and-control (1980-1984),
the surf clam fishery had an average annual growth rate of productivity of 7.2%, while the
quahog fishery achieved only a 2.4% average growth rate. In the transition period (1985-1989),
the average growth rate in both fisheries fell to less than 1%; however, the change in the growth
rate was greater in the surf clam fishery than in the quahog fishery. This steeper decline in
productivity growth in the surf clam fishery can be attributed to the accumulation of capital to
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maximize property rights allocations. The average productivity growth rate in the surf clam
fishery rebounded to 9% after implementation of ITQs to compensate for this period of reduced
growth (as inefficient vessels were withdrawn from use), while the average growth rate in the
quahog fishery increased more modestly to 4.4%.
These annual productivity growth rates over the policy periods show a significant
productivity slowdown in the surf clam fishery induced by policy expectations, while the quahog
fishery, where there was no expectation of a policy change, did not experience such a slowdown.
The results in Table 8 also help assess the real productivity impact of ITQs. On first glance, the
9% annual growth rate in the 1990-1995 period appears to indicate a rapid increase due to ITQs;
however, some of this growth is undoubtedly due to firms’ reversing the actions they took in the
transition period. As a result, productivity growth after ITQs should more reasonably be
compared to productivity growth during the command-and-control period prior to property rights
negotiations.

V. Conclusion
Although tradable property rights enjoy a number of theoretical advantages over
traditional command-and-control regulation, current policy debates question whether those
advantages are achieved in practice. This paper addresses the central question of whether
tradable property rights increase overall industry productivity, as predicted in theory. Rather
than simply comparing productivity before and after the moment of official policy change, it
looks in depth at the transitional period during which new regulations are negotiated in order to
assess the impact of policy expectations and strategic behavior on industry productivity. The
Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries provide an appropriate “manmade natural”
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experiment for addressing this question. Participants in the surf clam fishery expected that
tradable property rights would be allocated based on vessels’ historical harvests, while
participants in the ocean quahog fishery had no such expectation.
The results imply that both the public negotiation of a tradable property rights system and
the design of the property rights allocation scheme can depress productivity prior to actual
implementation of the new system. Because firms knew that surf clam quotas were to be
allocated based on vessels’ recorded catch and size, the opportunity cost of keeping a vessel
inactive increased during the negotiation period; as a result, additional capital flowed into this
already overcapitalized fishery. The result was a significant depression of productivity and
stagnation of productivity growth. In contrast, in the quahog fishery - where there was no
anticipation of property rights – overall productivity trends did not change prior to the actual
implementation of property rights.
This analysis has implications for both the economic analysis of environmental regulation
and the actual design of that regulation. Because productivity in the surf clam fishery was
temporarily depressed during the negotiation period, a simple comparison of productivity
immediately before and after the official policy change (in 1990) would yield an exaggerated
measure of the actual productivity gains realized. In order to accurately characterize the
direction and scale of productivity change, it is necessary to minimize the “bias” caused by
firms’ anticipatory behavior. This can be done by identifying the period during which firms may
respond to the new incentives created by expected policy change, and ensuring that the analysis
establishes a baseline prior to this transitional period.
In addition, the results have two important implications for the design of tradable
property rights systems for natural resource industries. First, if property rights are allocated to
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vessels rather than directly to capital owners, capital owners can only ensure their maximum
share of property rights by keeping vessels in production, regardless of whether this is
economically efficient. Second, this incentive to over-invest in capital is directly affected by the
weight given to harvests during the actual negotiation period; at one extreme, if allocations are
based solely on harvests during this period, capital owners will have exaggerated incentives to
maximize harvests at virtually any cost, without regard for efficiency or productivity in the short
term. The productivity slowdown observed in the surf clam fishery could be either exacerbated
or reduced through careful consideration of these policy levers.
In fisheries where negotiations over tradable property rights are ongoing, such as the
Pacific sablefish and Gulf snapper fisheries, regulators should pay close attention to the impact
of policy expectations on firms’ strategic behavior and on industry productivity. In these
fisheries in particular, the expiration of the moratorium on expanding the use of ITQs has in all
likelihood already motivated firms to increase their use of capital, with a consequent reduction in
productivity. To counter this inefficient behavior, regulators should seek to design allocation
schemes that do not reward such inefficient and productivity-reducing behavior. And when it is
time for economists to one day evaluate the impact of ITQs on these and other fisheries, they
should likewise ensure that their analyses incorporate the impact of this strategic behavior, rather
than accepting the distorted picture drawn by simple before-and-after comparisons. Otherwise,
economics threatens to create more confusion than clarity in the ongoing debate over ITQs.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1980-1995

1980-1984 mean
standard dev.
1985-1989 mean
standard dev.
1990-1995 mean
standard dev.

Surf Clams

Ocean Quahogs

Harvests

Quota

Quota

Abundance

2,256

2,250

129,941

3,254

3,900

410,720

442.25

410.41

19,510.99

425.27

223.61

2,287.36

2,956

3,229

157,509

4,576

5,620

399,480

150.62

104.69

3,275.91

288.07

531.04

4,842.73

2,804

2,803

141,268

4,742

5,267

380,967

191.26

116.35

3,431.62

139.59

186.19

6,575.61

Abundance Harvests

Note: All values in thousands of bushels
Source: MAFMC, Overview of the Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries and Quota
Recommendations for 2001 (August 2000)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Costs in Surf Clam Fishery
1980-1984

1985-1989

Standard

1990-1995

Standard

Standard

Mean

deviation

Mean

deviation

Mean

deviation

Fuel small

3,095,490

663,484

876,667

197,571

478,027

192,359

Fuel large

5,535,936

1,388,005

1,961,205

542,754

1,458,933

180,002

Labor small

4,054,691

972,841

4,288,724

646,231

2,751,052

478,926

Labor large

6,810,016

466,451

7,846,086

1,527,126

6,483,273

620,326

Gear small

2,047,609

290,234

1,233,063

123,074

817,848

188,668

Gear large

3,245,121

570,950

2,192,493

79,063

2,328,019

176,429

Capital small

7,411,387

926,904

5,962,129

584,111

1,857,691

1,295,555

Capital large

13,987,844

1,929,010

15,187,317

930,154

7,215,774

3,462,495

Note: All costs are in 1999 dollars (deflated using the US-CPI).
Source: MAFMC (2000)

Table 3: Cost Shares in Surf Clam Fishery, 1980-1995
M
45
46

1980-1984
1985-1989
49 1990-1995
47
48

N

O

Fuel
Small
Large
0.07
0.12
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.06

P

Q

Labor
Small
Large
0.09
0.15
0.11
0.20
0.12
0.29

R

S

Gear
Small
Large
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.10

T

U

Capital
Small
Large
0.16
0.30
0.15
0.39
0.07
0.30

Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Costs in Ocean Quahog Fishery
1980-1984
1985-1989
Standard

1990-1995

Standard

Standard

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Fuel small

477,983

105,347

421,463

196,641

476,792

70,173

Fuel large

4,759,477

578,300

4,071,835

1,033,224

3,574,913

598,073

481,618

184,628

700,354

231,445

1,088,369

192,610

Gear small

5,390,330
554,072

353,228
198,031

6,613,275
625,992

274,989
226,858

6,546,522
725,673

785,403
55,372

Gear large

5,347,277

753,775

7,080,994

396,350

6,419,658

290,100

Capital small

1,563,080

597,950

1,392,704

304,037

711,534

269,183

Capital large

8,396,428

1,152,913 10,841,919

792,471

5,577,928

1,243,126

Labor small
Labor large

Note: All costs are in 1999 dollars (deflated using the US-CPI).
Source: MAFMC (2000)

Table 5: Cost Shares in Ocean Quahog Fishery, 1980-1995

1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1995

Fuel
Labor
Gear
Capital
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
0.02
0.18
0.02
0.20
0.02
0.20
0.06
0.31
0.01
0.13
0.02
0.21
0.02
0.22
0.04
0.34
0.02
0.14
0.04
0.26
0.03
0.26
0.03
0.22

Source: Authors’ calculations
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Table 6: Tornqvist Index of Total Factor Productivity in Fisheries by Policy Era

1980-1984
Command & Control
1985-1989
Transition
1990-1995
Property Rights
Source: Authors’ calculations.13

Surf Clams
Standard
Mean
Deviation

Ocean Quahogs
Standard
Mean
Deviation

1.071

0.180

1.022

0.085

1.012

0.066

1.009

0.057

1.102

0.076

1.046

0.060

Table 7: Percent Change in Tornqvist Index of TFP over Policy Periods
Policy Periods

Surf Clams

Ocean Quahogs

1980-1984 to 1985-1989

-5.5%

-1.2%

1985-1989 to 1990-1995

8.9%

3.7%

1980-1984 to 1990-1995

2.8%

2.4%

Source: Authors’ calculations.

Table 8: Average Annual Productivity Growth Rates, 1981-1995
Period

Surf Clams

Ocean Quahogs

7.18%
(0.17)
0.97%
(0.07)
9.47%
(0.07)

2.35%
(0.08)
0.82%
(0.06)
4.40%
(0.06)

1981-1984
1985-1989
1990-1995
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Note: Standard deviations of growth rates over policy periods are given in parentheses.
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1

For reviews see Hahn and Noll (1982) for application to pollution, Moloney and Pearse (1979)

for the first application to fisheries, and Varian (1989) on the compensation mechanism.
Ellerman et al. (2000) provide a review of the U.S. experience with property rights under the
Acid Rain Program.
2

National Standard One for fisheries management states, "Conservation and management

measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimal yield from
each fishery for the United States fishing industry." National Standards Five and Seven state that
management must consider efficiency and cost minimization (Title III Section 301).
3

Gear restrictions, trip limits, and limits on the number of allowed fishing hours are often met

with increased capital in the fishery. For example, by 1978, the capital in the surf clam fishery
was large enough to harvest the entire year’s quota in only 15 days (Keifer, 1992). For further
discussion on fishery regulation and models, see Conrad (1999) pages 32-58.
4

Additionally, given a competitive market quota, the market price for quota should be equivalent

to the Pigovian tax (Clark, 1980). In reality, asymmetric information destroys this equivalence
(see Weitzman (1974) on cost uncertainty and Stavins (1998) on benefit and cost uncertainty).
5

For example, see Sea Watch International, et al. v. Secretary of Commerce, 762 F. Supp. 370

(1991).
6

The formal negotiations over ITQs began with a discussion paper written and circulated by the

management council in 1986 (MAFMC, 1986). Amendment Eight: Fishery Management Plan
for the Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery was approved by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council in cooperation with the National Marine Fisheries Service and the New
England Fishery Management Council in 1988 (MAFMC, 1988).
7

As noted by Weninger and Just (2002) the firm decision to enter or exit is influenced by both

uncertainty and imperfect capital malleability.
8

According to the economic theory, an index is “exact” for a specific production function if it is

derived from that particular function.
9

On a given fishing trip, the vessel harvests either surf clams or ocean quahogs, but never both.

10

Prices are converted from meat weights to bushels using 1 bushel=17 pounds of meat weights

for surf clams and 1 bushel=10 pounds of meat weights for quahogs.
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11

In the clam industry, wages are paid as a direct percentage of the gross revenue. Amendment

8 (NMFS, 1990) reports that the share going to crew averages 1/3. This rate was verified in field
interviews over 2000-2001.
12

To verify the calculations of TFP, the author compared the results from this study to

previously published studies. The levels of productivity of these fisheries are similar to those
estimated in other fisheries during periods of technological innovation (see for example, Jin et al.
(2002)).
13

The measures of total factor productivity are calculated using the chain method for indexes.
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